Fraud detection is extremely critical for e-commerce business. It is the intent of the companies to detect and prevent fraud as early as possible. Existing fraud detection methods try to identify unexpected dense subgraphs and treat related nodes as suspicious. Spectral relaxation-based methods solve the problem e ciently but hurt the performance due to the relaxed constraints. Besides, many methods cannot be accelerated with parallel computation or control the number of returned suspicious nodes because they provide a set of subgraphs with diverse node sizes.
INTRODUCTION
Fraud detection in large scale graph structures is very important. In many scenes, fraudsters try to manipulate networks for personal gain [1] . As online services are becoming increasingly popular, it a racts fraudsters to look for measures to abuse their virtual currency system. For example, in payment networks, like 'who-buys-what' graph, fraudsters make payments for something regularly and frequently in a speci c promotional campaign. However, they can obtain far more than what they paid. e promotional campaign, as one of important marketing tools, is very sensitive to be a acked and abused by fraudsters. Commonly, there are di erent kinds of promotional campaigns that are designed for various motivations. Most marketing campaigns will not last long and change a lot next time. erefore, it is di cult to collect labels and utilize historical data. In other words, supervised learning [11, 27, 29, 34] , a classical way to detect fraud behaviors, is very hard to be applied in such a scenario. In order to reduce the growing abuse of promotional campaigns, a rule-based system is developed to identify suspicious accounts. However, fraudsters would update means of fraudulence using techniques such as device and IP obfuscation to evade the rules, and there are increasing di culties in detecting these more sophisticated a acks. In addition, millions of fake user accounts are being created every day, and they further reduce the density of a acking and thus evade related rules. Graph-based approaches [13, 17, 30, 31] can analyze all events and users at the same time. And thus they can detect fraud behaviors and promotion abuse systematically. By nding the hidden relationships and behavior consistency among all accounts, graph-based methods can detect di erent groups of fraudsters without any label for training which are extremely expensive and time-consuming to get in the real world. As a data-driven approach, graph-based methods can reduce the costs generated by the lagged e ect of making rules as well.
Usually, subgraph analysis methods identify unexpectedly dense regions of the graph. Intuitively, density-based fraud detection methods in graphs share the same idea with density-based clustering approaches: both looking for subgraphs with a higher density than the remainder of the graphs/data. e task of density-based fraud detection is to nd all subgraphs that have anomalous pa erns (usually of high density) from the provided objective graph. ere are two main types of approaches for this task: spectral methods [17, 30, 31] and heuristic algorithms [13, 33] . Compared with spectral methods, the heuristic algorithms commonly have be er performance. However, heuristic methods commonly detect suspicious subgraphs with diverse sizes, and all nodes in one suspicious subgraph will be labeled as suspicious nodes. is property hurts the practicability of heuristic methods in real-world applications because they will lead to a zigzag ROC curve and precision-recall curve and thus we cannot select suspicious nodes by con guring recall or false positive rate. Besides, heuristic methods commonly tend to return the densest block because there is no e cient strategy to control how many blocks the algorithms should nd. e most important thing is that the heuristic process in algorithms is sequential and thus it is di cult to be parallelized. ese drawbacks greatly hinder their applications in the real world.
To address the aforementioned drawbacks, we propose a model, namely Ensemble based Fraud DETection (E FD ), in this paper. In E FD , we rst de ne the optimization problem of density-based fraud detection corresponding to our business scenarios. Second, we show how to make dense subgraphs detection practical by decomposing the original graph into small-sized subgraphs so as to lower the search costs. An ensemble framework is proposed in E FD , which employs three structural sampling methods for the bipartite graph with theoretical guarantees. e ensemble framework aggregating the outputs of several subproblems may reduce the overall risk of achieving a particularly poor suboptimal solution, and thus maintaining high prediction accuracy.
ird, a method FD is deployed in E FD to detect dense subgraphs, which enables a more e cient search for the top-k dense subgraphs. In addition, E FD can compute dense subgraphs detection in sampled graphs simultaneously, thus accelerating the optimizing process. Last, using real-life datasets of promotion campaigns, we conduct extensive experiments and show that E FD for fraud detection is e ective, practical, scalable and stable. Terminologies and technique names used in this part will be clari ed in great detail in Section 4.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Approaches in the eld of fraud detection can be categorized into three directions: feature-based, density-based and spectral-based.
Feature-based algorithms model the users and activities by representing them through a set of a ributes, such that each entity is represented as a vector in a multi-dimensional space. In order to distinguish normal users from fraudsters, the appropriate set of a ributes should be designed hand-cra ed, so that entities will lie in signi cantly di erent regions in this feature space. With the rise of deep learning, neural networks have also been used to extract features from fraudsters and relating events, and accomplish fraud detection through a classi er [11, 25, 27, 29, 34] . is class of algorithms o en require pre-labeled training data, which are used to nd the distinguishing a ributes. ese algorithms have been successfully used to predict trolls [7] , vandals [22] , hoaxes [23] , and sockpuppets [21] , among several other anomaly entities. Some of these feature-based algorithms are also e cient and e ective to nd anomaly users from unlabeled training data like linear models [28] , proximity-based models [4] , probabilistic models [20] and ensemble models [26] .
Density-based algorithms are designed based on the intuition that anomalous entities act synchronously, i.e., they o en take similar actions in near-similar times. When representing entities using their actions in a multi-dimensional space, the synchronous behavior of anomalous entities will form blocks with a higher density. Density-based algorithms are aimed at identifying these dense-blocks in large-scale behavior logs. ese algorithms have been successfully used to predict ill-go en page Likes [3] , zombie followers [16] , and spam [15] . Heuristic methods also solve the problem e ciently and e ectively. Charikar proposes a heuristic method to nd subgraphs with a large average degree [6] , which shows that subgraph average degree can be optimized with approximation guarantees. Tsourakakis [33] extends [6] to the K-clique densest subgraph problem.
Spectral-based approaches are more robust when facing adversarial a acking [13] , because any strange behavior would unavoidably generate edges in the graph like 'who-buy-where' and 'who-buy-what'. Usually, spectral-based methods also identify unexpectedly dense regions of the graph and treat related nodes as suspicious. ey try to transform the problem of identifying dense regions as the graph partitioning problem. erefore, there are two di erent ways to solve the problem. First, by spectral relaxation, graph partitioning can be e ciently solved by SVD or eigenvalue decomposition. SPOKEN [30] observes the 'eigenspokes' pa ern produced by pairs of eigenvectors of graphs and is later generalized for fraud detection in [17] . FBOX [31] focuses on the residual of SVD to detect a acks and [15] extends SVD to multimodal data. Several methods have used HITS-like [19] ideas to detect fraud in graphs [5, 8, 10, 12, 16] .
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will provide several critical de nitions at rst, and then formulate the problem we need to handle.
Terminology Definition
As an important part of marketing campaigns, e-payment usually provides many promotional campaigns with interesting services like a random discount. For example, each transaction can enjoy a 5-dollar discount if the transaction cost is greater than $5.01, or the discount can be a random value within 5 dollars no ma er what the total transaction cost is. We observe that fraudsters register many accounts to make the rules-based anti-fraud system fail. We can usually represent the information of marketing campaigns as a bipartite graph, which can be de ned as the 'who buy-from where' graph:
De nition 1 ('who buy-from where' graph): Consider user nodes U = {u 1 , ..., u m }, merchant nodes V = { 1 , ..., n }, and E which denotes the set of connections between U and V representing a purchase, we de ne that the bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E) is a 'who buy-from where' graph.
Based on the 'who buy-from where' graph, there exist two clues about the fraudsters according to our observations:
• synchronized behavior: suspicious nodes have extremely similar behavior pa erns, because they are o en required to perform similar tasks together such as payments in speci c stores. • rare behavior: the connectivity pa erns among high suspicious nodes are very di erent from the majority. Usually the density of subgraphs composed of highly suspicious nodes are signi cantly higher than other parts of the full graph.
But more complicated, even for suspicious nodes, they commonly show the property of aggregation in di erent regions. us we assume these groups are disjoint, and we need to nd all suspicious groups in a graph.
Problem Definition
Based on the 'who buy-from where' graph, instead of identifying the densest subgraph, the target of the fraud detection problem is not only nding the densest subgraph but also extracting all other unexpected dense subgraphs. In this paper, we formulate the fraud detection as nding k-disjoint subgraphs that maximize the sum of densities and propose a simple strategy to select the parameter k automatically and stably. Here, we formally de ne our problem as follows: Problem De nition: Given a 'who buy-from where' graph G = (U ∪ V, E), the fraud detection problem is to nd a group of vertex subsets S = {S 1 , ..., Sk } and S i ⊆ U ∪ V, wherek is the selected value of the parameter k.
Here, we make use of the density score to measure the density instead of the average density degree. According to [13] , given a graph G, its density can be e ectively measured with the following density score: De nition 2 (Density Score): Let the density score ϕ(G) to be
where d j denotes the node degree of the j t h merchant, and c is a small constant to prevent the denominator from becoming zero. e reason for penalizing high-degree merchant nodes in density score is to keep the detection e ective, even in the face of camou age. e more detailed explanation can reference to [13] as well.
Based on the graph density score measure, the fraud detection problem can be represented as the objective function:
Here, G(S i ) represents a subgraph which is composed of the vertex subset S i . It is not hard to prove that Equ. 1 is a NP-hard problem [2] .
PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we will introduce the proposed model E FD . At the very beginning, we will introduce three structural sampling methods with theoretical guarantees. A er that, the density-based fraud detection algorithm FD will be proposed which can be conducted for all sampled graphs in parallel. Finally, we will describe the ensemble approach E FD from a holistic perspective.
Sampling methods for bipartite graph
In real electric business platforms, the amount of transaction data is normally huge, and the response time for fraud detection is extremely demanding. In order to make our approach applicable to large scale data in the real world, we make use of sampling methods to decompose the fraud detection problem in a large scale graph into multiple smaller scale graphs which can be solved simultaneously through the parallel implementation. In this section, we will introduce multiple sampling choices for bipartite graphs in detail.
Why sampling can work.
Most of the real-world graphs are still too large to e ciently acquire, store and process. In order to facilitate the development and testing of systems in network domains, it is o en necessary to sample smaller subgraphs from the larger network structure [24] .
ere are two di erent sampling strategies: node sampling and edge sampling. In classic node sampling, nodes are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the original graph for inclusion in sampled graphs. All edges among the sampled nodes are added to form the sampled graph. But for a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E), U is not as the same type as V, thus we consider two di erent sampling strategies further: one-side node sampling and two-side node sampling. Edge sampling focuses on the selection of edges rather than nodes to build sampled subgraphs. us, the node selection step in edge sampling algorithm proceeds by just sampling edges, and including both nodes when a particular edge is sampled. e subgraph is created just out of the sampled edges, which means no extra edges are added in addition to those chosen during the random selection process. We provide eorem 1 to prove we can get a ϵ − approximation solution of Equ. 2 if we use the sampled subgraphs. eorem 1 Given an bipartite undirected graph G = (U ∪ V, E), let n be the number of vertices in the graph and c = Ω(ln n) be the minimum node-degree. We sample edges of G with probability p = 3(d +2) ln n ϵ 2 c independently to construct a subgraph G(S i ) and set their weights in G(S i ) as the original multiplied by 1 p . en G(S i ) is an ϵ − approximation of G under the density metric [9] :
Let f D (q) be the number of nodes of degree q in the original graph. Let |V s | be the target number of nodes in the sample graph. Let p = | V s | | V | be the probability of sampling a node in Node Sampling (NS). Let |E s | be the number of sampled edges in Edge Sampling (ES), then p e = | E s | | E | is the probability of sampling a particular edge in ES. Let E * [d q ] refers to the expected number of sampled nodes that have degree q in the original graph, where * refers to di erent sampling methods like following:
e above equations show each node has a uniform probability of being sampled in NS. For ES, the probability of selection is proportional to a node's degree. More speci cally, the likelihood of selection corresponds to the complement of the probability that none of the node's q edges is sampled. us ES selects high degree nodes with greater probability than NS. Formally, we have:
log(1−p e ) , ES will sample degree q nodes at a higher rate than NS (i.e.,
Random Edge Sampling (RES)
. RES is the most intuitive and simplest choice of sampling methods in a bipartite graph. e random edge sampling can be conducted with the following steps:
It's obvious that RES can sample subgraphs evenly and control the time consumption of each subgraph is similar. Based on Lemma 1, RES will sample nodes with larger degrees at a higher rate. What's more, from the view of the spectral, RES is likely to select dense components from the original bipartite graph with the rise of sample ratio S. Based on the problem we face, we know that such dense components have a greater likelihood of containing fraudulent nodes. At the same time, the sparse part will not be considered in the process, thus the method prunes low-risk nodes and reduces the hypothetical space during the procedure of ensemble construction.
One-side Node sampling (ONS).
A notable di erence between unipartite graphs and bipartite graphs is the node type. Nodes constituting a unipartite graph only belong to one type, but a bipartite graph has two types of nodes which can be seen as two sides of the graph. Obviously, ONS is a straightforward way to process the sampling of a bipartite graph. ONS can be operated as the following steps:
1. Construct the adjacency matrix W ∈ R | U |× |V | for the original bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V, E). 2. Determine the node type to sample. Here, assuming U. 3. According to the sample ratio S = |U i s |/|U|, sampling |U i s | rows from W to form the subgraph adjacency matrix W i s , 4. Construct the random sampled subgraph G i s based on W i s . From the steps above, we can nd that determining which side nodes to sample is a non-trivial option for ONS. Here, we have summed up some paradigms through practice.
• Task-oriented principle: First of all, we insist that the decision should depend on the problem to solve. For instance, if to deal with the link prediction or closeness measurement problems for one-side nodes, we should sample the target side nodes in order to measure the closeness with the support of global and complete information from the other side. Meanwhile, with the rise of sampled subgraphs, no node pair will be missed. However, when facing problems relating to dense subgraph detection, it's another kind of situation where we should take other properties into consideration like the speci c topology. We analyze the situation in the next bullet point. • Retain topology: We still take the problem relating to dense subgraph detection as an example. Here, we have a bipartite graph with D a (V) D a (U) where D a (U) is the average degree of U. In response to the task requirement, we care about retaining the topology of dense components from the original graph a er sampling. Obviously, if we sample U, the sampled subgraph will become a subgraph of uniform distribution, especially when D a (U) ∼ 1. In contrast, sampling V can retain dense topology from the original graph e ectively. Because once v ∈ V with a high degree is sampled, the dense components can be extracted.
ONS can conquer disparate structures more e ectively. Considering dense subgraphs problem, it's more e ective to select denser subgraphs from relatively dense ones a er sampling, and subgraphs that are not very signi cant to be selected with the global se ing become distinct on sampled graphs.
4.1.4 Two-sides Node Sampling (TNS). It's hard to avoid thinking about what if we conduct sampling to both sides of the bipartite graph. In fact, it's a fairly intuitive idea. From the view of the adjacency matrix, it is equivalent to sampling both rows and columns of W and using the cross-section of these rows and columns to construct the adjacency matrix W i s . Hence the detailed sampling steps are similar to ONS.
Here we need to remind a point to be er understand the number of sampled subgraphs N and the sample ratio S. Because we sample both sides of the bipartite graph, the sampled graph is smaller than RES or ONS with the same sample ratio S. In fact. when S = 0.1, the size of a subgraph from random edge sampling is 10% of the original one, but the subgraph sampled from two sides is only near S 2 of the original graph. So in practice, we usually need to enlarge the sampling ratio S or increase the number of samples N to ensure the e ectiveness of the two-sides sample. However, considering the parallel implementation of E FD , with the rise of N , more computing resources need to be occupied at the same time which may be unacceptable in real-world scenes. Besides, it's easy to understand that TNS will preserve the structure of the graph more nely and make it di cult to preserve speci c topology as needed like ONS, which is an aspect need to be considered.
Fraud DETection(FD ) algorithm based on Heuristic
e sampling methods are able to decompose the large scale graph into multiple smaller scale graphs. Now, we propose FD to complete fraud detections for each sampled subgraph. As we mentioned in Section 3.2, the fraud detection task in our realistic e-commerce scene is a disjoint case. We start from considering one natural heuristic for the disjoint case: at each step, we compute the densest subgraph G(S i ) = (S i , E i ) in the current graph G. Formally, to achieve G(S i ), nodes in G which result in the highest value of density score ϕ de ned in De nition 2 will be repeatedly obtained.
en we remove edges in previously detected subgraphs from the current graph G. Iteratively searching the dense subgraph until we nd thek th subgraph or the current graph contains no edges.
How to determinek is a very important issue. We insist thatk should be a parameter that exists objectively depending on how many dense subgraphs exist. erefore, when detecting dense subgraphs, we have to truncate the detection process e ectively instead of se ing a number or the more the be er. About truncating e ective dense components, the basic idea behind partitioning methods, such as k-means clustering [14] , is to de ne clusters such that the total intra-cluster variation or total WSS (within-cluster sum of square) is minimized. e total WSS measures the compactness of the clustering, and we want it to be as small as possible. e Elbow method [18, 32] treats the total WSS as a function of the number of the clusters: one should choose a number of clusters so that the total WSS doesn't improve signi cantly while adding another cluster. In this paper, we employ a similar idea to select thek. We see the total density measure k i ϕ(G(S i )) as a function ofk: one should choose a number so that k +1 i ϕ(G(S i )) doesn't improve much be er. In other words, ∆ 2 ϕ(G(S i )) which is the second-order nite di erence of ϕ(G(S i )) can be utilized
to measure the improvement of k i ϕ(G(S i )), and min(∆ 2 ϕ(G(S i ))) represents the density score ϕ suddenly decreases. erefore, we can de ne Truncating Point as:
We plot the curve of ϕ(G(S i )) for multiple sampled graphs as shown in Figure 1 , and one line represents one sampled graph. It can demonstrate this method is able to nd a reasonable hyperparameterk because all curves are monotonically decreasing and achieve a similar low score nally which means detected subgraphs are meaningless a er the truncating pointk. In the experiments, we will compare the performances between a xed k and the optimalk. By using minimal heap [13] , each update can be performed in O(log(|U| + |V |)) time, totaling O(k |E | log(|U| + |V |)) time because we need |E | updates to node degrees and repeatk times. We show FD in Algorithm 1. Typically, the numberk of groups varies from few to few tens. e required number of componentsk is o en expected to increase with the network size. However, based on sampling methods, the large scale graph can be decomposed into multiple smaller scale graphs. Besides, the algorithm FD is able to run on each sampled subgraphs in parallel. A er describing graph sampling methods and the fraud detection algorithm in each subgraph, we will introduce our proposed model E FD from a holistic view. 
Scores

Scores of detected blocks
Ensemble based Framework E FD E
FD is a general fraud detection method and can be applied to detect various fraud behaviors in real-world scenes. e structure of E FD is shown in Figure 2 . Meanwhile, the pseudo-code of E FD is available in Algorithm 2. In E FD , the process before applying the aggregation method can be implemented in parallel. A er sampling, we will apply FD to all sampled graphs simultaneously with the multicore environment. e parallel property of E FD is very meaningful and practical because there are high demands for running time in the real-world where graphs are very huge in size. en E FD applies the aggregation method to the results from all sampled graphs to get the nal fraud detection output. In experiments, we choose the majority voting aggregation method as de ned: De nition 4 (Majority Voting Aggregation Method (MV A)): e majority voting aggregation method can be described by this equation:
where h i (u) is the number of the vote-catching of the node u in sampled subgraph G i s , and the parameter T is a threshold. e parameter T normally is determined by task requirements and the preference for detection results. Although the heuristic algorithm FD is able to solve the fraud detection based on bipartite graphs with near-linear scalability, it is still unable to control the size of dense subgraphs which may limit its practicality. e threshold T is able to handle the quantity of detected suspicious nodes, and we will analyze the impact of T in Section 5.4. In fact, the aggregation methods are exible and can be set as the one suitable for the speci c requirement. Apply FD to G i s and get
EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the e ectiveness, stability, and scalability of E FD , extensive experiments are conducted in three datasets that come from real transaction data on JD.com. In this section, we will describe datasets in detail at rst. en the experimental se ings, including experimental setup, evaluation metrics, and comparison methods, will be introduced. Finally, we will display the experimental results together with the parameters impact analysis. Datasets we used in experiments are based on real transaction data on JD.com, one of the world's largest electric business platforms. A set of policies, rules, and models will determine levels of risk of all transactions on JD.com, and a subset of them with relatively high risk will be sent for additional manual checking. A team consisting of experienced experts in manual checking will review those transactions carefully and determine if they should be rejected. Once transactions are rejected, the PIN of users participating transactions will be marked as dangerous and be recorded in the Blacklist. e Blacklist is used as the ground-truth for evaluating fraud detection algorithms. A er cleaning up the original mass transaction data, we get PIN-Merchant bipartite graph ('who buy-from where' graph) which describes the trading relationship between users and merchants. For these three datasets, we also have three corresponding blacklists that contain dangerous PIN of users as the ground-truth. ese three datasets actually have to be independent of each other, because they are collected from di erent time periods, and the business scene we face is extremely time-sensitive. For example, one PIN appears in three datasets, but only in one dataset, it is marked as black which may be due to the the of accounts. And later because of some operations like appeals. the PIN can be removed from the blacklist. e key statistical data describing datasets can be found in Table 1 . We hold the view that in response to this kind of practical problem, experiments conducted on the datasets from the real-world are the most valuable and convincing.
Datasets Description
Experimental Se ings 5.2.1 Experimental Setup and Metrics.
In the experiments, E FD can be divided into three steps and conduct them step by step just like the description in Section 4.3. e key parameters are summarized in Table 2 , and extensive experiments with di erent combinations of parameters are conducted in order to discover interesting impacts. Voting threshold in aggregation method R e repetition rate R = S × N e main goal of our experiments is to compare the quality and quantity of the detected fraud nodes, thus we can choose conventional evaluation metrics to measure the performance. e methods we test in experiments can all output detected fraud nodes, thus we can use F1, Recall, Precision as evaluation metrics. It should be noted that normally Accuracy in fraud detection problems seems not very signi cant, because the proportion of fraud samples is quite low.
Comparison
Methods. e methods used in experiments are listed as following:
• E FD : E FD is the model proposed in this paper. We aim at demonstrating the practicability and stability of E FD and the advantage of the ensemble framework in time consumption without loss of detection performance in our experiments. • E FD F K: In E FD F K, we x the number of detected blocks K instead of truncating the detecting process automatically which is described in Section 4.2. e method is used to verify the e ectiveness of the truncation.
• SPOKEN: By spectral relaxation, SPOKEN [30] is able to nd the densest density regions with SVD method. SPOKEN is not parameter-free to make sure how many components should be used to estimate the suspicious nodes. So in our experiments, the number of components is set to 25 as same as the paper described. • FB : FB [31] analyzes the reconstruction error and shows a acks of small enough scale cannot be e ciently detected in the top-k SVD components. FB needs to set the parameter K which is a determinant factor of the reconstruction error.
• F : F [13] tries to nd a unexpected dense subgraph which commonly contains high suspicious users. Based on fair considerations, as an unsupervised learning method, we will not compare with supervised learning methods, such as some feature-based models and emerging GNN-based models [27, 29, 34] .
Experiment Result
5.3.1 Evaluation on Comparison Methods. e experimental results of all comparison methods in three datasets are shown in Figure 3 . We can nd that methods based on SVD, including SPOKEN and FB , are not able to keep a stable performance in di erent datasets. Especially for FB , almost completely invalidated on No.1 Dataset: Precision and Recall are close to 0, but it works on the other two datasets. It's obvious that F and E FD can get be er performance in all datasets. Because the performance of F can not be represented with a continuous curve, we use diamond points to represent experimental results of F . Overall, E FD has close Figure 4 where we set S as 0.1 and N as 80. e number of detected nodes is used in the x-axis of Figure 4 , because in response to the algorithms' task, the performance has a comparative value when E FD and F detect the equivalent fraud nodes. From Figure 4 (a)-4(c), we can nd E FD and F have similar performance in F1. However, what we are trying to express from these gures is not only a similar performance but also the practicability of E FD . E FD shows a smooth curve on Figure 4 , because the numbers of fraud nodes being detected in E FD are almost continuous with the control of T . In comparison, the numbers of detected nodes in F are marked with diamond points, and it's obvious that their connection is a polyline. is means that the quantities of detected nodes F are very discrete and the number of nodes in the detected blocks is unstable so that we are unable to control the number of nodes being detected and select one point that best ts our requirements on the curve. Besides, on Figure 4 (e) we can notice that there are several marks of F have apparent advantages compared with E FD , but from Figure 4 (b) this kind of advantage disappears when taking F1 into consideration. It re ects Recall is very too low to be used in the real world. And at the next point, F is going to be weaker than E FD , which spans almost 20, 000 nodes. Normally, such a huge span is unacceptable in the business, but E FD can be used through the entire curve which makes it practical in the face of real-world scenes. In terms of time consumption, we compared the running time of E FD and F which are both heuristic methods. Table 3 shows the running time of experiments where S = 0.1, N = 80 for E FD , and K is xed as 30 for F . F and E FD both runs near-linearly in the input size which veri es and ensures the scalability. Because E FD can be parallel and make use of the truncation strategy to decrease the number of detected blocks. E FD is 10X faster than F . In theory, T ime(E FD ) < S ×T ime(F ) which is demonstrated in our experiments. For the smallest S = 0.01 we tested, E FD can be 100x faster due to its parallelism. PIN Bagging (apply ONS as the sampling method in E FD ) is worst, but the curve of Node Merchant Bagging is much be er. In fact, the performance veri es our analysis in Section 4.1.3. In this dataset, the graph with D a (Merchant) D a (PI N ) leads to the failure of retaining the dense topology from the original graph e ectively by Node PIN Bagging. Conversely, Node Merchant Bagging can achieve be er performance with the support of keeping critical topology. However, some sampled graphs coming from Node Merchant Bagging can be very large in size due to some nodes with a very high degree. Although we set S as 0.1, the size of some sampled graphs can reach 30% of the original one which results in the higher time-consumption of parallel computation. Under this circumstance, we can discover Node Merchant Bagging has be er performance. Besides, the similar and stable performance of Node Merchant Bagging, Two-sides Node Bagging and Random Edge Bagging re ects the stability of E FD to a certain extent.
5.3.3
Verification of the truncating point. Figure 6 displays the results from a comparative experiment between E FD and E FD F K where the number of detected blocks k is xed instead of truncating the detecting process automatically. We set k = 30 for E FD F K, and E FD is based on the truncating point. In experiments, we also record the detected blocks number of E FD , and all of the records are smaller than 15. e performance expressed by the Precision-Recall curve shows E FD can achieve be er outcomes than E FD F K. Although E FD F K can get higher Recall with the increase of k, actually Precision has been close to random selection.
is kind of high Recall is meaningless and these blocks a er truncation are not of value as we de ned before. erefore, the comparison veri es the e ectiveness of the truncation strategy which can even level up the performance in Precision. What's more, the time-consumption has also been greatly reduced, because E FD only need to detect less than half of k sets for E FD F K in experiments. 
Impacts of various parameters
In this section, we evaluate the impacts of parameters shown in Table 2 . We conducte experiments, where the sampling method is xed as RES, in all three datasets, but only show the results on the No.3 dataset for the reason of the pages limitation when analyzing N and S. It should be emphasized that the impacts are consistent across the three datasets in our experiments.
Impact of N .
In order to evaluate the impact of the parameter N , we xed S as 0.1, and N changed within {10, 20, 40, 80}. e Precision-Recall curve, F1, Precision and Recall are displayed in Figure 7 . Here we have to explain why the number of detected nodes is used in the x-axis of Figure 7 (b)-7(d). Obviously, we doesn't mention the control of the last parameter T consistent in the comparative experiments. In fact, when the parameter N is not the same, the consistent T in not reasonable instead, because in this case there is a huge di erence in the total number of votes behind the same T . us for the sake of fairness, we compare performance when E FD detects the equivalent fraud nodes under di erent N . e results show that E FD achieves be er performance with a rise of N . In fact, this elevation of performance comes directly from the nature of the bagging method. However, we should note that the improvement in performance is not signi cant, especially with the increase of N . When comparing N = 40 and N = 80, we can nd the improvement has become negligible. At the same time, the rise of the cost of equipments is enormous which is not a fair trade-o . In addition, we can also discover that E FD is very stable when N ∈ {10, 20, 40, 80} which means the repetition rate R is between 1 and 8 times. e stability actually makes E FD has loose requirements for the computational environment: even if there are not enough parallel computing cores, E FD can still achieve relatively stable and acceptable performance.
Impact of S.
To evaluate the impact of S, we xed S × N = 1, instead of se ing N as a constant value. e reason why we choose such an experimental se ing is that the same repetition rate R is fairer for points and edges in the bipartite graphs. Besides, R itself is determined by the S and N , so a er the analysis of S and N , no additional analysis is needed for the dependent variable R. e Figure 8 shows the Precision-Recall curve, F1, Precision and Recall in the experiments with S ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1}. From Figure 8 (a)-8(d), we have two major ndings. On the one hand, we can see that the rise of S can bring a certain improvement in performance. We should remind that S will determine the size of sampled subgraphs, and the graphs in the real-world have a very large scale normally. A sampled subgraph with a relatively large scale still challenges the storage structure and the single computing core which is against the original intention of E FD . us we don't pay much a ention to the performance improvement with the rise of S. On the other hand, stability is also shown in this set of experiments. When S = 0.01, the performance shown in Figure 8 is still close to the one of S = 0.1. It means that when facing a large-scale graph structure, the stability of E FD allows you to sample the graph to a much smaller size without losing a lot of performance. Of course, when sampling large-scale graphs to ones of smaller size, N will increase to keep R constant. But we think this trade-o can be done according to task requirements and equipment conditions. If you are more concerned about time consumption with enough parallel computing cores or the original graph is too large to deal with, you can set a smaller S. Otherwise, if the performance is more critical or the original graph itself is not too large to handle, a relatively large S is a good choice. In fact, parameters S and N let E FD very exible enough to adapt to a variety of scenarios rather than make E FD complicated to be manipulated.
5.4.
3 Impact of T . e results shown in Figure 9 come from the set of experiments with S = 0.1, N = 80 and T ∈ {1, 2, . . . 39, 40}. Obviously, the experiment results show that Precision would go up and Recall would drop with the rise of T . e phenomenon is easy to understand because the fraud nodes with more votes are equivalent to having a higher risk in multiple sampled graphs. Meanwhile, the number of detected nodes will decrease with the increase of the threshold T which necessarily leads to the fall of Recall. We can nd the curves are smooth and monotonous in Figure 9 (c)-9(d) which is a nice property that can be exploited. Based on the curves, we can determine T in response to the task requirements: do we prefer to reduce the detecting error rate or to try to nd the fraud nodes as many as possible. In this case, we have a de nite direction when we need to tune the parameter T .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an ensemble approach E FD to solve the fraud detection problem in large graphs. First, we formulate the optimization problem for fraud detection according to our business scenarios. E FD scales up fraud detection through the ensemble framework, and we analyze the sampling methods in bipartite graphs as well. A heuristic method FD , which is one critical part of E FD , is proposed to detect dense subgraphs. e FD can also speed up the search process through an e cient truncation. Extensive experiments conducted on three real-world datasets demonstrate that E FD is e ective, scalable and stable. A er successful experiments on real data, E FD has been deployed in the risk control department of JD.com for further tests.
